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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

ROUND TABLE

11TH ANNIVERSARY BROADCAST

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A RADIO DISCUSSION OF

Are We Overconfident?

BALDWIN · CHERNE · McKEON

415th BROADCAST IN COOPERATION WITH THE NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY · 203

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

ROUND TABLE

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No. 203

NOTE

The supplementary information contained in the footnotes to the following text, developed by staff research, is not to be considered as representing the opinions of the ROUND TABLE *speakers. Following the transcript of the broadcast are questions which readers may wish to use for analysis and discussion. It is hoped that teachers and discussion leaders may find this additional service of the* ROUND TABLE *transcript helpful in their study of the subject discussed in the broadcast.*

ARE WE OVERCONFIDENT?

ELEVENTH ANNIVERSARY BROADCAST OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE*

HANSON BALDWIN, Military Analyst, *New York Times*

LEO M. CHERNE, Executive Secretary, Research Institute of America, Inc.; Lecturer at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and at the United States Industrial College

RICHARD P. MCKEON, Dean of the Division of the Humanities, University of Chicago

*A radio discussion broadcast from Radio City, New York, over the Red Network of the National Broadcasting Company, Sunday, February 1, 1942, at 2:30 P.M., Eastern Standard Time.

The ROUND TABLE, oldest educational program continuously on the air, is broadcast entirely without a script, although participants meet in advance, prepare a topical outline, and exchange data and views. Subjects are chosen because of their social, political, or economic significance. The program has no "ax to grind." In the selection of speakers, the effort is to provide a balanced discussion by participants who have special competence and knowledge. The opinion of each speaker is his own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of Chicago or the National Broadcasting Company.

ARE WE OVERCONFIDENT?

●

Do you think that the worst is yet to come or that it is now just a matter of time until the Axis powers will be defeated?

Typically, a naval or land reverse on some democratic front is met with a shrug of the shoulders and "We'll get 'em—just wait till we start!"

Can the United States lose this war? Are there serious obstacles yet to be overcome before the might of American industry can be translated into land and sea victories in all parts of the world? Are Americans complacent? Overconfident?

To analyze strategic problems of the military situation, the economic front, and national morale, under the topic "Are We Overconfident?" the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE *brought to its microphone three expert observers: a military analyst, an economist, and an educator.*

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MR. MCKEON: The question of confidence and overconfidence, which we are to discuss, is in part a question of facts and information and in part a question of reaction to that information.

If I were asked the question whether the American people are overconfident today, I should look to the headlines and the news. The facts and opinions expressed are optimistic, and there is a tendency to soft-pedal the black side of the news. Even when it

comes through, the reaction is not so definite to the bad aspects as to the good. Americans, it seems to me, have become complacent again since Pearl Harbor.

Baldwin, you've been examining the military situation. Do you find that tendency in that region of our information?

MR. BALDWIN: First, I want to emphasize that anything I say today represents my own personal opinion.

Yes. I should say that the United States is no exception to the universal law of nations. We *can* lose this war. If it were not for the German retreat in Russia, the military situation today might be termed almost catastrophic.

What about the "battle of the factories," Cherne?

MR. CHERNE: I'm afraid that that battle is little more than a reflection of battles on the war fronts. If we had continued at the level of war production that we had reached before Pearl Harbor, our government estimates that it would have taken ten years to achieve a stalemate with Germany alone.

MR. MCKEON: What you two gentlemen have been saying can be reduced to the difference between the general statements, the bland assumptions, and the pious hopes that the people have and the actual situation.

Let us turn, first, to the military situation. A great many assumptions have been made. It has been said repeatedly that we can lick the Japs in six weeks; that one American can lick six Japs. How do you appose the cold military facts to these generalizations and beliefs?

MR. BALDWIN: The calendar is the best refutation of that old shibboleth that we can lick the Japs in six weeks. It has been

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more than six weeks since December 7. We hear the same sort of remarks about every possible situation that we may confront. We hear that the enemy does not like cold steel. We hear that the enemy cannot confront American soldiers if we come to hand-to-hand combat. Yet I should like to invite the attention of the radio audience to an article in the February, 1942, *Infantry Journal*, by Lieutenant Scofield,[1] who points out that the Japanese "consider the bayonet the most essential weapon they carry and are taught to indulge in bayonet-sticking whenever they can close with the enemy."

MR. CHERNE: I think perhaps a more fundamental common belief is found in the statement that the American Navy is second to none.

MR. BALDWIN: "Second to none" is meaningless unless you consider the strategical situation. The truth is that we have a two-ocean war and a one-ocean navy. At the present time we have sixteen battleships compared to eleven in the Japanese Navy. But we have two oceans between which those battleships must be disposed. We have great obligations in the Atlantic against German submarine warfare, and we have the tremendous distances of the Pacific.

MR. MCKEON: What you've been saying can be brought to bear on the problems of overconfidence and what the people think by the difference between the information we get and the conception of the ends that we are pursuing. What are we trying to do? Is this a situation in which a defensive war is enough? Can we merely use our military and naval strength to defend ourselves?

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[1] *Lieutenant John Scofield, "The Jap War Machine," "Infantry Journal,"* February, 1942.

MR. BALDWIN: Obviously not. The history of the last two and a half years has, I think, forever exploded that old shibboleth that the defensive can win wars. The offensive, and *only* the offensive, can win wars.

MR. CHERNE: What is the strategic position of the United States in relation to our enemies?

MR. BALDWIN: Imagine a map of the world. The United States plainly occupies what is known in military parlance as an "interior position" in what is a war of continents. That is to say, if the enemy makes any attack upon the United States, or upon the Western Hemisphere, we enjoy the advantage of operating on shorter lines of communication than the enemy can possibly do.

But, on the other hand, if we extend our might to the western Pacific; if we send our fleets and armies to that area; or if we send our fleets and armies to the Mediterranean and to Europe, it is quite obvious that we are then operating against an enemy who enjoys the advantage of the interior position.

It's very much like a spider at the center of his web. Japan is the spider, operating from the mandated islands and from the Japanese islands, and we are trying to crawl around the outside of that web to strike a vital blow at the spider.

MR. CHERNE: These spider webs that you speak of seem to be placed in different parts of the world, depending upon the analysis of the situation. We're at the center of the defensive spider web, but we're on the exterior of the spider web that leads to Japan. This comes back pretty much to the phrase that you quoted from Homer Lea's book, *The Valor of Ignorance.*[2] Are we depending upon that kind of ignorant valor?

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[2] *Homer Lea, "Valor of Ignorance" (New York: Harper & Bros. 1909).*

MR. BALDWIN: I am afraid there is too much misconception of the terrific strategical problems that we face both in the Pacific and in the Atlantic. We are "slothful with fat pride."

To carry this discussion of strategy a little farther, I'd like to point out, however, that we do enjoy certain advantages which the enemy does not enjoy. In the western Pacific and in the European sphere we have the value of bases—bases from which we may operate against that spider at the center of his web. As long as we can hold those bases, it is possible for us to take the offensive—the offensive that wins wars—against that spider. But those bases must be held in order to provide a springboard for a future offensive.

MR. CHERNE: That is unquestionably the real value of Singapore, is it not?

MR. BALDWIN: Without any question. Singapore, I think, is to most people just a name on a map, just as Mandalay is a romantic song. Singapore is of prime importance as the springboard of which I spoke. It is not usable as such today, of course, because we must first gird ourselves with the products of our factories, so that we may be capable of undertaking the offensive.

But we must understand, I think, that the whole strategy of the United Nations is based upon the concept that we can hold certain bases, certain bastions like the Malay barrier; that we can hold Germany within the confines of Europe, away from the oil of the Caucasus, and from the eastern Mediterranean; and that we can prevent Japan from erupting through the Malay barrier into the South Pacific or into the Indian Ocean.

MR. MCKEON: How are we supplied with secondary springboards? Suppose we do lose Singapore; are there any other bases in

the Netherlands East Indies or in Australia or on the outlying islands?

MR. BALDWIN: That is where the picture becomes even more somber than it is today. If you have made a study of these secondary bases, you can understand the tremendous importance of Singapore. There is really no other main base between Calcutta and Sidney. Amboina, in the Netherlands East Indies, is purely a secondary base. It has docks which can take cruisers up to about fourteen thousand tons, but it has not the facilities to accommodate a first-class fleet or even the air bases to accommodate tremendous air power.

MR. CHERNE: How about Port Darwin in Australia?

MR. BALDWIN: Port Darwin is vastly overemphasized as a base. It is on the northwestern coast of Australia and is separated from the most inhabited and industrialized areas of Australia by the great Australian desert. Any of you who have read C. Hartley Grattan's book, *Introducing Australia*,[3] will realize the extreme limitations of that place as a naval or air base. There's not even enough water there for the present garrison, much less for any additional troops that might be sent. And Australian troops that were sent to Darwin to garrison it last spring actually traveled three thousand miles by two narrow-gauge railways, by road, and by broad-gauge railway, before they were able to reach Darwin.

MR. CHERNE: While we are concentrating on the Far East, we are likely to ignore the situation in Russia and in North Africa.

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[3] *Clinton Hartley Grattan, "Introducing Australia" (New York: John Day, Inc., 1942).*

Now, in the case of Russia, many people feel that the Russians have routed the Germans.

MR. BALDWIN: There is no evidence whatsoever that the Germans have been routed in Russia. "Rout" has the connotation of precipitant flight, in which the troops throw away their weapons and think only of their own personal safety. There are no indications of that in Russia today.

MR. MCKEON: There are repeated special articles of the same sort, which would seem to indicate that we are hoping for an armed revolt in the subjugated countries. What are the military possibilities behind those hopes?

MR. BALDWIN: I'd like to ask another question: Can you revolt against tanks and planes if you don't have tanks and planes yourself?

MR. MCKEON: To sum up what you've been saying, since I don't want to answer that question, it would seem that you are saying once more, as you have said so forcefully in the past few weeks, that this is a war that we can lose. Have you any suggestions that will relieve the somberness of that picture?

MR. BALDWIN: It *is* a war that we can lose. I think we can win it, and will win it, with unified planning, unified procurement, unified direction of operations, intelligent leadership, and complete and all-out effort. This is total war, with all that that implies.

MR. MCKEON: In the discussion of questions that involve military strategy I think it would be well for the members of this discussion to bear in mind that we are, ourselves, illustrating a very important element of strength in democracies which breaks through this somber picture.

THE GERMAN-SOVIET WAR

In Terms of United States Territory



Shaded: German Occupied

Black: Soviet Counteroffensive

We are celebrating the eleventh anniversary of the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE today. For eleven years groups such as this have met to discuss important problems. Now, even at a time of great crisis, we nonetheless have an opportunity to bring our thoughts before the public and to recommend solutions to a problem on which there is a great deal of difference of opinion and to which the conclusions may be rather dreary and somber. This, I think, is a particularly appropriate reflection with which to turn to your problem, Cherne, which concerns the production front. There is more confusion on that subject than on any other, and I think the bland assumptions and pious hopes are even more dangerous there. I've been told, for example, that our factories can lick the world. How do you feel about that as a generalization?

MR. CHERNE: Our factories *can* outarm the world, but not today —and not the factories as they stand today.

MR. MCKEON: How do we go about bringing them into a condition in which they can? What is the situation? What is the ideal for which we are driving?

MR. CHERNE: An auto-assembly line, a perfume-bottling plant, even a shoe factory, cannot equip or arm anybody unless they are converted to military production.

MR. MCKEON: What you say there strikes me as a point which should be reiterated, since there is, as I understand your remark, a very important difference between the conversion of existing plants to military production and the expansion program which we have indulged in during the past few years.

MR. CHERNE: Let me just dismiss the problem of expansion with a few words. I think we've lost the battle of expansion. I think

that, as a result of our inability or lack of willingness to expand, we today have insufficient quantities of certain basic materials like aluminum. War is no time, however, to start expanding plant capacity, or there will be no prospect of a military offensive in 1943.

MR. BALDWIN: What's the solution?

MR. CHERNE: Unfortunately we have no real plan for conversion, as the Under-Secretary of the Army and the Under-Secretary of the Navy and the directors of the OPM admitted at the recent auto conference. There is unquestionably an immediate need for planned conversion.

Now, Nelson's appointment[4] and the creation of the War Production Board are important forward steps. As a matter of fact, within the last six weeks there's been a tremendous lift in both the enthusiasm and the direction of our war program.

MR. MCKEON: What you two are saying seems to me to fit together very well. Baldwin, you point to the need of a concerted, unified plan to win the military offensive. That, I take it, will not occur before 1943; and, Cherne, you emphasize the need of a production program which, I take it, would have to occur in 1942. We've seen the figures that relate to that plan. They not only are the large figures which terrify the layman—fifty-six billion dollars is hard to visualize—but there is a further problem of how that large figure is to be related to our actual processes.

Just how would you translate fifty-six billion dollars into a picture of the factories we must have, of the efforts we should make,

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[4] *On January 21, 1942, Donald Nelson, director of the War Production Board, abolished the Office of Production Management, and OPM keymen were transferred to the WPB.*

and of the effects it will have upon the lives of the citizens? That is a large question; take it piece by piece.

MR. CHERNE: First of all, fifty-six billion dollars doesn't mean much to anybody. Fifty-six billions or even one billion is an astronomical figure that can't be translated.

I think this is important, though, about the fifty-six-billion-dollar program: If we're to have that much munitions in 1942, between 75 and 85 per cent of every piece of machinery in the United States, in small plants, big plants, the village smithy, and the automobile factory, must be used full time on war production.

MR. MCKEON: What percentage are we using now?

MR. CHERNE: I don't think we are using very much more than 25 per cent of our machinery today. That means that before the end of 1942, and as soon as possible in 1942, we've got to triple the use of the machinery that is today available in the United States.

MR. MCKEON: Wouldn't that require a kind of over-all plan? The optimistic remarks you made a few minutes ago about Nelson's new activities and the organization that he heads would seem to indicate that an over-all program is coming from that direction.

MR. CHERNE: Unfortunately we do not yet have the over-all plan. Very fortunately we have the over-all direction. Nelson and Henderson are likely to be the "two-headed Baruch" running our industrial mobilization for war.

Now, it took us a long time to learn the need for coordinated direction in our economic mobilization. We have no right to be confident until we learn to coordinate every element of our economic life into a pattern built for victory. Prices, taxes, corporate profits, wages, labor supply, rationing, and compulsory savings (and, by the

way, we'll have compulsory savings before the end of this year) are all pieces of a complicated machine that must be fitted together. They can't be approached separately.

MR. MCKEON: If we stick to the production end of the question, the automobile industry seems to me to represent the concrete terms in which many of our citizens can understand the problem. This is the first day of February. We've been told that January would be the last month in which new cars for civilian purposes would be made, and, therefore, the auto industry, as I understand it, is being converted in the fashion you've indicated. How well are we doing? What has been involved? What are the problems?

MR. CHERNE: Unfortunately the automobile industry is not being converted in the fashion I have indicated. The production of private cars is being stopped, but at the present time the decision as to how to convert has not yet been completed. Our failure to make that decision before this date may, in time, rank with the failure we have already achieved at Pearl Harbor.

MR. BALDWIN: The whole strategy of the war, it seems to me, is geared to one thing today, and that is merchant shipping. Everything depends on that not only today but in the future. How is our production of merchant vessels coming along?

MR. CHERNE: I'm happy I can strike an optimistic note in this case. I think we'll come closer to our goal in the production of new ships than we will in the production of guns, tanks, or any other item in our war program. As a matter of fact, before the end of 1942 I think we will reach our goal of two ships a day.

MR. BALDWIN: That's cheering, at least. When the President made his production speech, he obviously set our sights very high.

SINGAPORE AND SECONDAR

LIED BASES IN THE FAR EAST

He said, I think, that we hope to produce, or that we *would* produce, sixty thousand planes this year and one hundred and twenty-five thousand planes next year.

Now I believe that in the past it's been generally thought by aviation experts that if you could double the production of the previous year you would be doing very well. We produced something like twenty thousand planes last year. If we can produce sixty thousand planes this year, we will be tripling that quantity, not just doubling it. Do you think we can do that?

MR. CHERNE: I think we can do it if we do several things. First of all, the Army and the Navy must standardize their specifications and designs for planes so that the mass-production industries can turn out the planes on an assembly line instead of individually. I don't think we can turn out sixty thousand planes a year without some type of standardization of plane models.

MR. MCKEON: I think it would be well to emphasize the time factor in these generalizations. Can we produce enough in the time required by the military? Obviously we can produce enough if given endless time, but how will the time factor work for us?

MR. CHERNE: The time factor is, as far as I am concerned, the most important factor in our economic and military preparation. I have no doubt that we are going to accomplish all these goals, but I have a very great doubt that we will accomplish them as quickly as we must or should.

MR. MCKEON: You talked earlier not only about production but about the effects of this production program upon the life of the ordinary citizen. How will the ordinary citizen be affected during the next year or during the next eighteen months? What will it do to his standard of living?

Mr. Baldwin: That's what I want to know, too.

Mr. Cherne: I don't think more than 5 per cent of the people know how much tax they're going to pay this March. If they estimate how much they are going to pay this March, then this is true: Double that amount will come out of their pockets either in taxation or in compulsory savings the following March.

Mr. Baldwin: Gosh! Who's going to buy my baby's shoes?

Mr. Cherne: I don't know. I don't think you'll have difficulty getting the essentials of life, but I do think you will have difficulty getting many of the things that you've been accustomed to.

Mr. McKeon: You've been talking about the problems of the average citizen. What about the businessman? I was interested to see the announcement of your book, *Your Business Goes to War*.[5] Does the businessman face an entirely different problem?

Mr. Cherne: I think the businessman is probably better informed about the meaning of a war economy than is the average layman. But even the businessman does not stop to realize that by, or before, the middle of 1943 our standard of living must be lower than in the worst year of the depression. As a matter of fact, if this isn't true, not only are we overconfident but we will be well on our way toward losing this war.

Mr. McKeon: Thus far we've been talking about military facts, economic facts, facts of production, and facts of campaign. That's only half of the problem of confidence and overconfidence, it seems

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[5] *Leo M. Cherne, "Your Business Goes to War," to be published April, 1942, by Houghton Mifflin Co.*

to me. It's the effect of information upon the individual. And, just as there are bland assumptions about the situation, I think there are bland assumptions and pious hopes that affect the psychology, the reaction, of the citizens in our present situation.

MR. BALDWIN: What do you mean?

MR. MCKEON: I think the most general form in which this bland confidence may be stated is that the average citizen has heard warnings such as we have given many times. He's likely to repeat, "This is going to be a hard struggle, a long struggle. We've got to tighten our belt—put everything into it." But with that he combines the notion that we shall inevitably win the war, and, having fixed his mind on that level, having decided the effort is necessary but that we shall win, he relaxes again; and with relaxation the effort disappears, so that you have a circle. It is a circle in which you merely repeat words without understanding the effect of the words.

MR. CHERNE: I think that probably the most important contributing reasons for that are the common assumptions we make about the enemy, their courage, and their morale. It is very frequently said that the Germans are cracking up or that the Japs are running out of oil.

MR. MCKEON: That's an easy way to solve our own problems of morale. Instead of examining what we are thinking or how we are reacting, we sit back and hope that the situation is worse in other countries.

The Italians have been the subject of that kind of thinking. There was a joke in *Punch* a few months ago in which the Italians apparently were dissatisfied, according to the jokester, because they were not getting enough land. And the question was asked: What did they want—did they expect to get *Italy?*

Mr. Baldwin: In other words, we have a sort of comfortable complacency.

Mr. McKeon: It is a comfortable complacency, which is combined with the statement that we are not complacent. I think that we are therefore faced with the problem of finding the means by which the public can be brought into relation to the news.

There are three elements that enter into the situation that each of us have emphasized. You, Baldwin, have talked about the military.

Mr. Baldwin: The military element seems to me to be quite clear. There must be a certain compulsion of fear, if you like, behind this whole thing, because this is a war for life itself. We are fighting for our lives.

Mr. Cherne: I think, fortunately, that we are on our way to getting the economic compulsions that will establish the drive in our industrial life.

Mr. McKeon: And, finally, it seems equally important to have not merely the sense that we are fighting for our lives but the fear that accompanies that sense. The direction that we are going should also be perfectly clear in the minds of everyone.

We have discussed the problem of confidence from a variety of points of view, and I think we are in substantial agreement on the military side, on the productive side, and on the side of morale. But we have merely discussed the fact of confidence and the fact of overconfidence, not the causes or the remedies.

In general, I think it should be said that the American people, although they tend to complacency, are not overconfident. The leadership does tend rather more to overconfidence than the people

themselves, and the people are, as is frequently the case, ahead of the leadership.

Under these circumstances it is not a black picture which we are drawing. We can lose the war unless the attitude of overconfidence is abandoned. And even if we do not lose the war, we can blunder to a victory which will be so costly in men, in matériel, and in spiritual values as to be indistinguishable from a defeat.

OBJECTIVE QUESTIONS FOR EXAMINATION

The answers to the following questions may be found in the text of the broadcast, and page references are provided to assist in locating the answers.

*

1. What factor prevents the present Allied military situation from being "catastrophic"? Page 3.

2. At the level of United States production on December 7, 1941, how long would it have taken to achieve a stalemate with Germany? Page 3.

3. What is Mr. Baldwin's appraisal of the American naval problem? Page 4.

4. What are the military advantages of defending an "interior position"? Page 5. Under what conditions does the United States have an "interior position"? Page 5.

5. What is the importance of Singapore? Page 6. What is the character of the secondary naval bases in the Far East? Page 7.

6. What action is necessary, according to Mr. Baldwin, for the United Nations to win the war? Page 8.

7. What productive effort is necessary, according to Mr. Cherne, to produce fifty-six billion dollars' worth of munitions in 1942? Page 12.

8. What factors must be coordinated for economic mobilization? Pages 12–13.

9. What are the goals for merchant-ship production? Page 13.

10. What are some of the factors necessary for us to achieve our airplane production goals? Page 16.

11. According to Mr. Cherne, how will a full war economy affect our 1943 standard of living? Page 17.

QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The following questions of wider scope, intended for discussion, are suggested by the broadcast, and answers may be found in the literature on the subject listed in the section "Suggested Readings," found on pages 23–24.

*

1. Do you think the American people are overconfident? Do you think the leadership of the American people has not adequately warned the people of what lies ahead? Would you say the people of your community are complacent?

2. Is an impression of optimism gained by reading the newspaper headlines and listening to the news commentators? Would you say sugar-hoarding is evidence of lack of confidence?

3. Are there certain popular beliefs or stereotypes that have gained currency in the American thinking that do not have established importance or a factual basis?
   a) German morale is breaking.
   b) The Axis doesn't have enough oil to wage a long war.
   c) There will be revolt in the occupied countries.
   d) The Japanese will collapse economically.
   e) American factories can lick the world.

4. Do the American people have a proper appreciation of the amount of war material being produced? What are the facts behind the rationing of steel, aluminum, sugar, etc.? Will it be possible to expand production of vital materials enough to allow civilians to retain their present standard of living?

5. Is it possible for the United States to lose this war? What steps should be taken to guarantee an American victory? Do you think it is possible for us to fight a war so long and wasteful that "victory will be . . . . indistinguishable from a defeat"? Discuss.

SUGGESTED READINGS

"Check-up on the Arms Effort," *United States News*, January 23, 1942. *Summary of Senator Truman's report on the defense effort.*

Garnett, David, *War in the Air: September 1939—May 1941*. New York: Doubleday, 1941. *Indicates the faults Britain must correct if victory is to be won.*

Garsia, Lieutenant Colonel Clive, *Planning the War*. New York: Penguin, 1941. *Suggestions for streamlining Britain's war effort.*

Graves, Robert, and Hodge, Alan, *The Long Week End*. New York: Macmillan, 1941. *A picture of English complacency during the two interwar decades.*

HARSCH, JOSEPH C., *Pattern of Conquest.* New York: Doubleday, 1941. *Argues that Hitler can be defeated only by fighting and not through an internal crack-up of the regime.*

LERNER, MAX, "The Margin of Waste," *New Republic,* January 26, 1942. *Warns against the optimism that would allow us to fight a long, wasteful war.*

MITCHELL, DONALD W., "How To Lose the War," *Nation,* January 24, 1942. *Argues that it is possible to lose this war through complacency.*

REVEILLE, THOMAS, *The Spoil of Europe.* New York: Norton, 1941. *Shows how Hitler has made conquest pay rather than weaken him.*

SCHUMAN, FREDERICK L., *Design for Power.* New York: Knopf, 1941. *An analysis of the power of the contending forces in World War II.*

"Tragic Lag," *New Republic,* January 12, 1942. *A review of the failures of the American defense program.*

WASHBURN, STANLEY, "What Makes Morale?" *Public Opinion Quarterly,* winter, 1941. *A picture of why the morale of the Japanese, the Russians, and the Germans is so strong, reported by a member of the United States Army Intelligence.*

WERNER, MAX, *Battle for the World.* New York: Modern Age, 1941. *Military history of World War II and analysis of Allied weaknesses.*

The Listeners' Round Table . . . .

Letters to the ROUND TABLE *frequently contain interesting and illuminating sidelights on the subject matter discussed on the air. These comments are from letters received following the broadcast discussion of "How United Are the Americas?" January 25, 1942.*

*

Unity at Home

Before trying to bring unity to South America, do you or do you not think that we should first have it here in the U.S.A.? Or at least at the same time. Are we a united people? Few of our leaders seem to have the courage to admit the facts about unity and what must be done if we are to have it. What can we do? When we come to our senses and recognize an American as an American regardless of race, we will be on the right road.

N. R. D., Michigan

*

"-Americans"

All the South and Central American residents were called *Latin* Americans—a special kind of citizens—*citizens*, all right, but hyphenated and not so good as Americans. . . . . Pray, what kind of person does it take to make an American? . . . . Those whom they would foster are proud of being Mexicans, Brazilians, Chileans, or of whatever name a citizen of their particular country is called. You know darn well that you won't get anywhere toward friendship with them by using a phrase which indicates you believe they are inferior. You profess to be trying to wean them from Italy, Spain, and the other European countries, yet you constantly refer to them as originating in such places.

It is almost universal to make this mistake, following our President, of course, but it is the worst of psychology and poor dressing for an argument. You know these Americans residing below the Rio Grande maintain that out skins are thick and that we can't learn, so on the next program I expect to hear the same mistakes made.

R. A. S., Texas

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The Common People

I have been enjoying these discussions very much. Scientific and unbiased information and opinions are certainly needed. In my connection with farm groups and especially as a long-time member of the Kansas Agricultural Land Use and Planning Committee, I am astonished at the selfish

appraisal of problems confronting us.

In your discussion of relations with South American countries you pointed out—even rather mildly—that our relations with these countries are handicapped by high finance. If we are ever to have a better world, it will be necessary that in any development of resources the common people of the country as a whole must be the beneficiary of such wealth to a much greater extent. The protection of the well-being of the masses is of greater importance than the protection that makes it possible for a few to amass great fortunes. This would be the safeguard against socialism and communism.

Keep up your good work. We appreciate it.

H. A., Kansas

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LISTS

OF 1938–40 TRANSCRIPTS STILL IN PRINT WILL BE SENT UPON REQUEST. STUDENTS AND TEACHERS WILL FIND THESE ISSUES TO BE VALUABLE COMMENTARIES UPON EVENTS OF THE PERIOD.

Nos.

1941

149. *Morale: First Line of Defense?*
150. *Can Capitalism Defend America?*
152. *Can the Americas Be Invaded?*
153. *Guns or Butter?*
154. *Dilemma in the Far East*
155. *How To Fight Nazi Propaganda*
156. *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*
157. *Strikes and National Defense*
158. *Defense Economics*
159. *Should We Convoy to Britain?*
161. *War Aims and Peace Aims*
162. *Which Road for America?*
163. *Lessons from Europe's War*
164. *The Effect of the Blitzkrieg on the Economic Order*
165. *Defense and America's Health*
166. *Roosevelt* vs. *Hitler*
167. *Polls and the Crisis*
168. *Where's Bunker Hill?*
169. *War against the Middle Classes?*
170. *The Crisis and Your Pocketbook*
171. *America and the German-Soviet War*
172. *Soviet Russia at War*
173. *Our Liberties*
174. *Blueprint for Hemisphere Defense*

Nos.

175. *Should America Clear the Seas of the Nazis?*
177. *Defense: Who'll Pay the Piper?*
178. *Japan: Setting Sun?*
179. *National Unity*
180. *Weapons of Economic War*
182. *Crisis of Capitalism*
183. *Freedom of the Seas*
185. *New Frontiers in Education and Research*
186. *Anti-Semitism*
188. *Economics of Blitzkrieg*
189. *Showdown with Japan?*
190. *Science and War*
191. *Defense Inventory*
192. *The Philippines*
193. *Little Business: What Now?*
194. *Labor's Responsibility in Defense*
195. *Canada: Neighbor at War*
196. *Civil Rights and "Public Danger"*
197. *Manpower: The Key to Victory*
198. *What Does Rationing Mean?*

1942

199. *Morale: Ours and Theirs*
200. *How To Meet the Menace of Inflation*
201. *Censorship*
202. *How United Are the Americas?* January 25

ALL ROUND TABLE TRANSCRIPTS CONTAIN ADDED FACTUAL MATERIAL IN THE FORM OF GRAPHS, MAPS, PICTOGRAPHS, FOOTNOTES, BIBLIOGRAPHIES, ETC.

ROUND TABLE NETWORK OF 101 STATIONS

2:30 P.M. EASTERN STANDARD TIME

City	Call Letters	Kilocycles	City	Call Letters	Kilocycles
Allentown, Pa.	WSAN	1470	Manchester, N.H.	WFEA	1370
Altoona, Pa.	WFBG	1340	Miami, Fla.	WIOD	610
Asheville, N.C.	WISE	1400	New York, N.Y.	WEAF	660
Atlanta, Ga.	WSB	750	Norfolk, Va.	WTAR	790
Boston, Mass.	WNAC	1260	Philadelphia, Pa.	KYW	1060
Buffalo, N.Y.	WBEN	930	Pittsburgh, Pa.	KDKA	1020
Charleston, S.C.	WTMA	1250	Portland, Me.	WCSH	970
Charlotte, N.C.	WSOC	1240	Providence, R.I.	WJAR	920
Cleveland, Ohio	WTAM	1100	Raleigh, N.C.	WPTF	680
Columbia, S.C.	WIS	560	Richmond, Va.	WMBG	1380
Columbus, Ohio	WCOL	1230	Rochester, N.Y.	WHAM	1180
Dayton, Ohio	WING	1410	Savannah, Ga.	WSAV	1340
Detroit, Mich.	WWJ	950	Schenectady, N.Y.	WGY	810
Florence, S.C.	WOLS	1230	Springfield, Ohio	WIZE	1340
Grand Rapids, Mich.	WOOD	1300	Tampa, Fla.	WFLA	970
Greenville, S.C.	WFBC	1330	Washington, D.C.	WRC	980
Jacksonville, Fla.	WJAX	930	Wilmington, Dela.	WDEL	1150
Johnstown, Pa.	WJAC	1400	Winston-Salem, N.C.	WSJS	600
Lakeland, Fla.	WLAK	1340	Zanesville, O.	WHIZ	1240
Lima, Ohio	WLOK	1240			

1:30 P.M. CENTRAL STANDARD TIME

Amarillo, Texas	KGNC	1440	Louisville, Ky.	WAVE	970
Birmingham, Ala.	WBRC	960	Madison, Wis.	WIBA	1320
Bismarck, N.D.	KFYR	550	Mankato, Minn.	KYSM	1230
Bristol, Tenn.	WOPI	1490	Memphis, Tenn.	WMC	790
Chicago, Ill.	WMAQ	670	Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minn.	KSTP	1500
Duluth, Minn., and Superior, Wis.	WEBC	1320	New Orleans, La.	WSMB	1350
Eau Claire, Wis.	WEAU	1070	Oklahoma City, Okla.	WKY	930
El Paso, Texas	KTSM	1380	Omaha, Neb.	WOW	590
Evansville, Ind.	WGBF	1280	Pittsburg, Kans.	KOAM	810
Fargo, N.D.	WDAY	970	Rochester, Minn.	KROC	1340
Fort Wayne, Ind.	WGL	1450	St. Cloud, Minn.	KFAM	1450
Fort Worth, Texas	KGKO	570	St. Louis, Mo.	KSD	550
Hattiesburg, Miss.	WFOR	1400	San Antonio, Texas	WOAI	1200
Indianapolis, Ind.	WIRE	1430	Shreveport, La.	KTBS	1480
Jackson, Miss.	WJDX	1300	Sioux Falls, S.D.	KSOO	1140
Kansas City, Mo.	WDAF	610	Springfield, Mo.	KGBX	1260
Kingsport, Tenn.	WKPT	1400	Terre Haute, Ind.	WBOW	1230
Laurel, Miss.	WAML	1340	Tulsa, Okla.	KVOO	1170
Little Rock, Ark.	KARK	920	Wichita, Kans.	KANS	1240

12:30 P.M. MOUNTAIN STANDARD TIME

Albuquerque, N.M.	KOB	1030	Phoenix, Ariz.	KTAR	620
Billings, Mont.	KGHL	790	Pocatello, Ida.	KSEI	930
Boise, Ida.	KIDO	1380	Salt Lake City, Utah	KDYL	1320
Bozeman, Mont.	KRBM	1450	Tucson, Ariz.	KVOA	1290
Butte, Mont.	KGIR	1370	Twin Falls, Ida.	KTFI	1270
Denver, Colo.	KOA	850	Yuma, Arizona	KYUM	1240
Helena, Mont.	KPFA	1240			

11:30 A.M. PACIFIC STANDARD TIME

Fresno, Cal.	KMJ	580	San Francisco, Cal.	KPO	680
Los Angeles, Cal.	KFI	640	San Diego, Cal.	KFSD	600
Medford, Ore.	KMED	1440	Seattle, Wash.	KOMO	950
Portland, Ore.	KGW	620	Spokane, Wash.	KHQ	590
Sacramento, Cal.	KFBK	1530			

STATIONS CARRYING ROUND TABLE BY TRANSCRIPTION

Cincinnati, Ohio	WSAI	1360	10:30 P.M. E.S.T.
Milwaukee, Wis.	WTMJ	620	4:00 P.M. C.S.T.

Labor Policies in Wartime

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A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE BROADCAST

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FEBRUARY 8, 1942

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DON D. LESCOHIER, Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin

RALEIGH W. STONE, Associate Professor of Industrial Relations, University of Chicago

T. O. YNTEMA, Professor of Statistics, School of Business, University of Chicago

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SUGGESTED READINGS

HARD, WILLIAM, "Should Labor Have Glass Pockets?" *Reader's Digest,* January, 1942.

"One Big Union?" *Business Week,* January 24, 1942.

SLICHTER, SUMNER, "Labor and the War," *Atlantic Monthly,* May, 1941.

STRAIGHT, MICHAEL, "The Automobile Conference," *New Republic,* January 19, 1942.

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